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The Poet: Compared And Contrasted With Historian And Philosopher
The Poet: Compared And Contrasted With Historian And Philosopher
Now whom shall we find, since the question standeth for the highest form
in the school of learning, to be moderator? Truly, as me seemeth, the poet;
and if not a moderator, even the man that ought to carry the title from them
both, and much more from all other serving sciences. Therefore compare we the
poet with the historian and with the moral philosopher; and if he go beyond
them both, no other human skill can match him. For as for the divine, with all
reverence it is ever to be excepted, not only for having his scope as far
beyond any of these as eternity exceedeth a moment, but even for passing each
of these in themselves. And for the lawyer, though Jus be the daughter of
Justice, and Justice the chief of virtues, yet because he seeketh to make men
good rather formidine poenae^11 than virtutis amore^12 or, to say righter,
doth not endeavour to make men good, but that their evil hurt not others;
having no care, so he be a good citizen, how bad a man he be; therefore, as
our wickedness maketh him necessary, and necessity maketh him honorable, so is
he not in the deepest truth to stand in rank with these, who all endeavor to
take naughtiness away, and plant goodness even in the secretest cabinet of our
souls. And these four are all that any way deal in that consideration of men`s
manners, which being the supreme knowledge, they that best breed it deserve
the best commendation.
[Footnote 11: Fear of punishment.]
[Footnote 12: Love of virtue.]
The philosopher therefore and the historian are they which would win the
goal, the one by precept, the other by example; but both not having both, do
both halt. For the philosopher, setting down with thorny arguments the bare
rule, is so hard of utterance and so misty to be conceived, that one that hath
no other guide but him shall wade in him till he be old, before he shall find
sufficient cause to be honest. For his knowledge standeth so upon the abstract
and general that happy is that man who may understand him, and more happy that
can apply what he doth understand. On the other side, the historian, wanting
the precept, is so tied, not to what should be but to what is, to the
particular truth of things, and not to the general reason of things, that his
example draweth no necessary consequence, and therefore a less fruitful
doctrine.
Now doth the peerless poet perform both; for whatsoever the philosopher
saith should be done, he giveth a perfect picture of it in some one by whom he
presupposeth it was done, so as he coupleth the general notion with the
particular example. A perfect picture, I say; for he yieldeth to the powers of
the mind an image of that whereof the philosopher bestoweth but a wordish
description, which doth neither strike, pierce, nor possess the sight of the
soul so much as that other doth. For as, in outward things, to a man that had
never seen an elephant or a rhinoceros, who should tell him most exquisitely
all their shapes, color, bigness, and particular marks; or of a gorgeous
palace, an architector, with declaring the full beauties, might well make the
hearer able to repeat, as it were by rote, all he had heard, yet should never
satisfy his inward conceit with being witness to itself of a true lively^13
knowledge; but the same man, as soon as he might see those beasts well
painted, or that house well in model, should straightways grow, without need
of any description, to a judicial comprehending of them; so no doubt the
philosopher, with his learned definitions, be it of virtues or vices, matters
of public policy or private government, replenisheth the memory with many
infallible grounds of wisdom, which notwithstanding lie dark before the
imaginative and judging power, if they be not illuminated or figured forth by
the speaking picture of poesy.
[Footnote 13: Living.]
Tully taketh much pains, and many times not without poetical helps, to
make us know the force love of our country hath in us. Let us but hear old
Anchises speaking in the midst of Troy`s flames, or see Ulysses, in the
fulness of all Calypso`s delights, bewail his absence from barren and beggarly
Ithaca. Anger, the Stoics said, was a short madness. Let but Sophocles bring
you Ajax on a stage, killing and whipping sheep and oxen, thinking them the
army of Greeks, with their chieftains Agamemnon and Menelaus, and tell me if
you have not a more familiar insight into anger, than finding in the schoolmen
his genus and difference. See whether wisdom and temperance in Ulysses and
Diomedes, valor in Achilles, friendship in Nisus and Euryalus, even to an
ignorant man carry not an apparent shining. And, contrarily, the remorse of
conscience, in Oedipus; the soon-repenting pride of Agamemnon; the self -
devouring cruelty in his father Atreus; the violence of ambition in the two
Theban brothers; the sour sweetness of revenge in Medea; and, to fall lower,
the Terentian Gnatho and our Chaucer`s Pandar so expressed that we now use
their names to signify their trades; and finally, all virtues, vices, and
passions so in their own natural states laid to the view, that we seem not to
hear of them, but clearly to see through them.
But even in the most excellent determination of goodness, what
philosopher`s counsel can so readily direct a prince, as the feigned Cyrus in
Xenophon? Or a virtuous man in all fortunes, as Aeneas in Virgil? Or a whole
commonwealth, as the way of Sir Thomas More`s Utopia? I say the way, because
where Sir Thomas More erred, it was the fault of the man, and not of the poet;
for that way of patterning a commonwealth was most absolute, though he,
perchance, hath not so absolutely performed it. For the question is, whether
the feigned image of poesy, or the regular instruction of philosophy, hath the
more force in teaching. Wherein if the philosophers have more rightly showed
themselves philosophers than the poets have attained to the high top of their
profession, - as in truth,
Mediocribus esse poetis
Non Dii, non homines, non concessere columnae, -^14
[Footnote 14: "Neither gods nor men nor booksellers permit poets to be
mediocre." - Horace, "Ars Poet.," 372-3]
it is, I say again, not the fault of the art, but that by few men that art can
be accomplished.
Certainly, even our Saviour Christ could as well have given the moral
commonplaces of uncharitableness and humbleness as the divine narration of
Dives and Lazarus; or of disobedience and mercy, as that heavenly discourse of
the lost child and the gracious father; but that his thorough-searching
wisdom knew the estate of Dives burning in hell, and of Lazarus in Abraham`s
bosom, would more constantly, as it were, inhabit both the memory and
judgment. Truly, for myself, me seems I see before mine eyes the lost child`s
disdainful prodigality, turned to envy a swine`s dinner; which by the learned
divines are thought not historical acts, but instructing parables.
For conclusion, I say the philosopher teacheth, but he teacheth
obscurely, so as the learned only can understand him; that is to say, he
teacheth them that are already taught. But the poet is the food for the
tenderest stomachs; the poet is indeed the right popular philosopher. Whereof
Aesop`s tales give good proof; whose pretty allegories, stealing under the
formal tales of beasts, make many, more beastly than beasts, begin to hear the
sound of virtue from those dumb speakers.
But now it may be alleged that if this imagining of matters be so fit for
the imagination, then must the historian needs surpass, who bringeth you
images of true matters, such as indeed were done, and not such as
fantastically^15 or falsely may be suggested to have been done. Truly,
Aristotle himself, in his Discourse of Poesy, plainly determineth this
question, saying that poetry is QlXoboQwrePov and bnoudalorePov, that is to
say, it is more philosophical and more studiously serious than history. His
reason is, because poesy dealeth with kaOoXou, that is to say with the
universal consideration, and the history with kaO` ekabrov, the particular.
[Footnote 15: Imaginatively.]
"Now," saith he, "the universal weighs what is fit to be said or done,
either in likelihood or necessity - which the poesy considereth in his imposed
names; and the particular only marketh whether Alcibiades did, or suffered,
this or that:" thus far Aristotle. Which reason of his, as all his, is most
full of reason.
For, indeed, if the question were whether it were better to have a
particular act truly or falsely set down, there is no doubt which is to be
chosen, no more than whether you had rather have Vespasian`s picture right as
he was, or, at the painter`s pleasure, nothing resembling. But if the question
be for your own use and learning, whether it be better to have it set down as
it should be or as it was, then certainly is more doctrinable^16 the feigned
Cyrus in Xenophon than the true Cyrus in Justin; and the feigned Aeneas in
Virgil than the right Aeneas in Dares Phrygius; as to a lady that desired to
fashion her countenance to the best grace, a painter should more benefit her
to portrait a most sweet face, writing Canidia upon it, than to paint Canidia
as she was, who, Horace sweareth, was foul and ill-favored.
[Footnote 16: Instructive.]
If the poet do his part aright, he will show you in Tantalus, Atreus, and
such like, nothing that is not to be shunned; in Cyrus, Aeneas, Ulysses, each
thing to be followed. Where the historian, bound to tell things as things
were, cannot be liberal - without he will be poetical - of a perfect pattern;
but, as in Alexander, or Scipio himself, show doings, some to be liked, some
to be misliked; and then how will you discern what to follow but by your own
discretion, which you had without reading Quintus Curtius? And whereas a man
may say, though in universal consideration of doctrine the poet prevaileth,
yet that the history, in his saying such a thing was done, doth warrant a man
more in that he shall follow, - the answer is manifest: that if he stand upon
that was, as if he should argue, because it rained yesterday therefore it
should rain to-day, then indeed it hath some advantage to a gross conceit.
But if he know an example only informs a conjectured likelihood, and so go by
reason, the poet doth so far exceed him as he is to frame his example to that
which is most reasonable, be it in warlike, politic, or private matters; where
the historian in his bare was hath many times that which we call fortune to
overrule the best wisdom. Many times he must tell events whereof he can yield
no cause; or if he do, it must be poetically.
For, that a feigned example hath as much force to teach as a true example
- for as for to move, it is clear, since the feigned may be tuned to the
highest key of passion - let us take one example wherein a poet and a
historian do concur. Herodotus and Justin do both testify that Zopyrus, king
Darius` faithful servant, seeing his master long resisted by the rebellious
Babylonians, feigned himself in extreme disgrace of his king; for verifying of
which he caused his own nose and ears to be cut off, and so flying to the
Babylonians, was received, and for his known valor so far credited, that he
did find means to deliver them over to Darius. Muchlike matter doth Livy
record of Tarquinius and his son. Xenophon excellently feigneth such another
stratagem, performed by Abradatas in Cyrus` behalf. Now would I fain know, if
occasion be presented unto you to serve your prince by such an honest
dissimulation, why do you not as well learn it of Xenophon`s fiction as of the
other`s verity? and, truly, so much the better, as you shall save your nose by
the bargain; for Abradatas did not counterfeit so far.
So, then, the best of the historian is subject to the poet; for
whatsoever action or faction, whatsoever counsel, policy, or war-stratagem
the historian is bound to recite, that may the poet, if he list, with his
imitation make his own, beautifying it both for further teaching and more
delighting, as it pleaseth him; having all, from Dante`s Heaven to his Hell,
under the authority of his pen. Which if I be asked what poets have done? so
as I might well name some, yet say I, and say again, I speak of the art, and
not of the artificer.
Now, to that which is commonly attributed to the praise of history, in
respect of the notable learning is gotten by marking the success, as though
therein a man should see virtue exalted and vice punished, - truly that
commendation is peculiar to poetry and far off from history. For, indeed,
poetry ever setteth virtue so out in her best colors, making Fortune her well
- waiting handmaid, that one must needs be enamored of her. Well may you see
Ulysses in a storm, and in other hard plights; but they are but exercises of
patience and magnanimity, to make them shine the more in the near following
prosperity. And, of the contrary part, if evil men come to the stage, they
ever go out - as the tragedy writer answered to one that misliked the show of
such persons - so manacled as they little animate folks to follow them. But
the historian, being captived to the truth of a foolish world, is many times a
terror from well-doing, and an encouragement to unbridled wickedness. For
see we not valiant Miltiades rot in his fetters? The just Phocion and the
accomplished Socrates put to death like traitors? The cruel Severus live
prosperously? The excellent Severus miserably murdered? Sylla and Marius dying
in their beds? Pompey and Cicero slain then, when they would have thought
exile a happiness? See we not virtuous Cato driven to kill himself, and rebel
Caesar so advanced that his name yet, after sixteen hundred years, lasteth in
the highest honor? And mark but even Ceasar`s own words of the forenamed Sylla
- who in that only did honestly, to put down his dishonest tyranny - literas
nescivit:^17 as if want of learning caused him to do well. He meant it not by
poetry, which, not content with earthly plagues, deviseth new punishments in
hell for tyrants; nor yet by philosophy, which teacheth occidendos esse;^18
but, no doubt, by skill in history, for that indeed can afford you Cypselus,
Periander, Phalaris, Dionysius, and I know not how many more of the same
kennel, that speed well enough in their abominable injustice or usurpation.
[Footnote 17: He was without learning. Sidney here seems to miss the point of
a joke of Caesar`s reported by Suetonius.]
[Footnote 18: That they are to be killed.]
I conclude, therefore, that he excelleth history, not only in furnishing
the mind with knowledge, but in setting it forward to that which deserveth to
be called and accounted good; which setting forward, and moving to well -
doing, indeed setteth the laurel crown upon the poet as victorious, not only
of the historian, but over the philosopher, howsoever in teaching it may be
questionable. For suppose it be granted - that which I suppose with great
reason may be denied - that the philosopher, in respect of his methodical
proceeding, teach more perfectly than the poet, yet do I think that no man is
so much YlXoYlXoboYos^19 as to compare the philosopher in moving with the
poet. And that moving is of a higher degree than teaching, it may by this
appear, that it is well nigh both the cause and the effect of teaching; for
who will be taught, if he be not moved with desire to be taught? And what so
much good doth that teaching bring forth - I speak still of moral doctrine -
as that it moveth one to do that which it doth teach? For, as Aristotle saith,
it is notyvwbls^20 but nPaEls^21 must be the fruit; and how nPaEls cannot be,
without being moved to practise, it is no hard matter to consider. The
philosopher showeth you the way, he informeth you of the particularities, as
well of the tediousness of the way, as of the pleasant lodging you shall have
when your journey is ended, as of the many by-turnings that may divert you
from your way; but this is to no man but to him that will read him, and read
him with attentive, studious painfulness; which constant desire whosoever hath
in him, hath already passed half the hardness of the way, and therefore is
beholding to the philosopher but for the other half. Nay, truly, learned men
have learnedly thought, that where once reason hath so much overmastered
passion as that the mind hath a free desire to do well, the inward light each
mind hath in itself is as good as a philosopher`s book; since in nature we
know it is well to do well, and what is well and what is evil, although not in
the words of art which philosophers bestow upon us; for out of natural conceit
the philosophers drew it. But to be moved to do that which we know, or to be
moved with desire to know, hoc opus, hic labor est.^22
[Footnote 19: A friend to the philosopher.]
[Footnote 20: Knowledge.]
[Footnote 21: Practice.]
[Footnote 22: This is the work, this the labor." - Virgil, "Aeneid," VI.,
129.]
Now therein of all sciences - I speak still of human, and according to
the human conceit - is our poet the monarch. For he doth not only show the
way, but giveth so sweet a prospect into the way as will entice any man to
enter into it. Nay, he doth, as if your journey should lie through a fair
vineyard, at the very first give you a cluster of grapes, that full of that
taste you may long to pass further. He beginneth not with obscure definitions,
which must blur the margent^23 with interpretations, and load the memory with
doubtfulness. But he cometh to you with words set in delightful proportion,
either accompanied with, or prepared for, the well-enchanting skill of
music; and with a tale, forsooth, he cometh unto you, with a tale which
holdeth children from play, and old men from the chimneycorner, and,
pretending no more, doth intend the winning of the mind from wickedness to
virtue; even as the child is often brought to take most wholesome things, by
hiding them in such other as to have a pleasant taste, - which, if one should
begin to tell them the nature of the aloes or rhubarb they should receive,
would sooner take their physic at their ears than at their mouth. So is it in
men, most of which are childish in the best things, till they be cradled in
their graves, - glad they will be to hear the tales of Hercules, Achilles,
Cyrus, Aeneas; and, hearing them, must needs hear the right description of
wisdom, valor, and justice; which, if they had been barely, that is to say
philosophically, set out, they would swear they be brought to school again.
[Footnote 23: Margin.]
That imitation whereof poetry is, hath the most conveniency to nature of
all other; insomuch that, as Aristotle saith, those things which in themselves
are horrible, as cruel battles, unnatural monsters, are made in poetical
imitation delightful. Truly, I have known men, that even with reading Amadis
de Gaule, which, God knoweth, wanteth much of a perfect poesy, have found
their hearts moved to the exercise of courtesy, liberality, and especially
courage. Who readeth Aeneas carrying old Anchises on his back, that wisheth
not it were his fortune to perform so excellent an act? Whom do not those
words of Turnus move, the tale of Turnus having planted his image in the
imagination?
Fugientem haec terra videbit?
Usque adeone mori miserum est?^24
[Footnote 24: "Shall this land see him fleeing? Is it so very wretched to
die?" - Virgil, "Aeneid," XII., 645-6.]
Where the philosophers, as they scorn to delight, so must they be content
little to move - saving wrangling whether virtue be the chief or the only
good, whether the contemplative or the active life do excel - which Plato and
Boethius well knew, and therefore made Mistress Philosophy very often borrow
the masking raiment of Poesy. For even those hard-hearted evil men who think
virtue a school-name, and know no other good but indulgere genio,^25 and
therefore despise the austere admonitions of the philosopher, and feel not the
inward reason they stand upon, yet will be content to be delighted, which is
all the good-fellow poet seemeth to promise; and so steal to see the form of
goodness - which seen, they cannot but love - ere themselves be aware, as if
they took a medicine of cherries.
[Footnote 25: To give way to one`s inclination."]
Infinite proofs of the strange effects of this poetical invention might
be alleged; only two shall serve, which are so often remembered as I think all
men know them. The one of Menenius Agrippa, who, when the whole people of Rome
had resolutely divided themselves from the senate, with apparent show of utter
ruin, though he were, for that time, an excellent orator, came not among them
upon trust either of figurative speeches or cunning insinuations, and much
less with far-fetched maxims of philosophy, which, especially if they were
Platonic, they must have learned geometry before they could well have
conceived; but, forsooth, he behaves himself like a homely and familiar poet.
He telleth them a tale, that there was a time when all parts of the body made
a mutinous conspiracy against the belly, which they thought devoured the
fruits of each other`s labor; they concluded they would let so unprofitable a
spender starve. In the end, to be short - for the tale is notorious, and as
notorious that it was a tale - with punishing the belly they plagued
themselves. This, applied by him, wrought such effect in the people, as I
never read that ever words brought forth but then so sudden and so good an
alteration; for upon reasonable conditions a perfect reconcilement ensued.
The other is of Nathan the prophet, who, when the holy David had so far
forsaken God as to confirm adultery with murder, when he was to do the
tenderest office of a friend, in laying his own shame before his eyes, - sent
by God to call again so chosen a servant, how doth he it but by telling of a
man whose beloved lamb was ungratefully taken from his bosom? The application
most divinely true, but the discourse itself feigned; which made David (I
speak of the second and instrumental cause) as in a glass to see his own
filthiness, as that heavenly Psalm of Mercy well testifieth.
By these, therefore, examples and reasons, I think it may be manifest
that the poet, with that same hand of delight, doth draw the mind more
effectually than any other art doth. And so a conclusion not unfitly ensueth:
that as virtue is the most excellent resting-place for all wordly learning
to make his end of, so poetry, being the most familiar to teach it, and most
princely to move towards it, in the most excellent work is the most excellent
workman.
But I am content not only to decipher him by his works - although works
in commendation or dispraise must ever hold a high authority - but more
narrowly will examine his parts; so that, as in a man, though all together may
carry a presence full of majesty and beauty, perchance in some one defectious
piece we may find a blemish.
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